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Mandating Precontractual Disclosure
ERIC H. FRANKLIN*
Parties negotiating an arm's-length contract are generally not
required to disclose facts to one another. Although this default rule is
supported by both centuries of common law and freedom of contract
principles, courts and legislatures treat certain transactions differ-
ently. This is particularly true in circumstances in which the default
rule results in an unacceptable harm suffered by a broad group of
persons. In such cases, lawmakers have acted to impose precontrac-
tual disclosure obligations. These decisions and statutes are largely
reactive: A harm is identified in a certain transaction's precontractual
period and disclosure is mandated to rectify the harm. These reactive
measures, although helpful, are insufficient in some instances. Large
scale economic calamities are often caused by information asymme-
tries in individual contracts. This was true in the Great Depression
(unregulated contracts for sales of stock) and the Great Recession
(unregulated contracts for sales of mortgage-backed securities).
This article proposes an analytical tool to prospectively identify
such transactions. This tool, the Disclosure Framework, provides
lawmakers with a means of identifying circumstances in which it is
appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure. To accomplish this
task, the Disclosure Framework directs lawmakers to identify the
information asymmetry in a transaction and balance the respective
harms of either disclosure or nondisclosure on the affected stake-
holder group.
Precontractual disclosure is a matter of compelling immediacy.
Because regulatory agencies are currently struggling with how to
structure the disclosure mandates of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the question of when it is
appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure is both timely and
important. Although designed for legislators, the Disclosure Frame-
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work may also serve as a tool for consumer rights groups and agen-
cies (such as the recently established Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau) to help spur legislative action. Ultimately, the Disclosure
Framework provides support for the imposition of precontractual dis-
closure that is both theoretically sound and consistent with common
law and statutory exceptions to the default rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Let me take you back in time. Imagine you are a high school
senior.' You have spent the previous three years getting good grades,
taking admissions tests, and writing personal statements. The hard work
has paid off, and several colleges have accepted you. You have nar-
1. If this is a bridge too far, the exercise also works if you imagine yourself as a parent of a
high school senior.
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rowed the choice to two, but no matter how hard you try, you cannot
choose. You see no discernible difference in reputation or academic
offerings, and you would happily live in either school's location. In fact,
the only meaningful distinguishing factor that you can discern is tuition:
One school is significantly cheaper. However, you suspect that this dif-
ference might be offset by living expenses; the cheaper school is in New
York City, and the more expensive school is in a small rural town.
To help make your decision, one of the schools provided a financial
aid award letter that lists a tremendous amount of information in a clear,
easily understood format. Such information includes your estimated
expenses, the amount most students borrow to attend the school, the rate
of graduates that ultimately default on their loans, and an estimated
monthly loan payment.2
This is a fantastic tool, so you naturally ask the other school to
provide a similar letter. After all, you are not making this decision in a
vacuum, and you will only be able to make an informed decision if you
can put the proffered data in perspective. Unfortunately, the other school
refuses to provide the information.3
You find it disconcerting that schools expect you to sign a contract
obligating you to hundreds of thousands of dollars of debt without
knowing all the relevant information. However frustrating, for many
transactions, contract law does not prohibit the school's behavior. Gen-
erally speaking, as long as the school neither lies nor knowingly allows
you to rely on a falsehood,4 contract law does not view the school's
behavior as inappropriate.5 However, absent clear violations such as
2. This financial aid award letter is based upon a model letter, otherwise known as the
"Shopping Sheet," created by a partnership between the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
and the Department of Education to address the rising costs of education by helping students
"'know before they owe."' See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Partner to Promote Transparency in College Costs
(July 24, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/obama-administration-and-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-partner-promote-tr.
3. At the time of this writing, providing the Shopping Sheet is largely voluntary for schools.
Id. As of November 15, 2012, over 500 schools have pledged to use the Shopping Sheet by
the 2013-14 school year. Ame Duncan, More Than 500 Colleges Agree to Adopt Financial
Aid Shopping Sheet, HOMEROOM-THE OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/ 11/more-than-500-colleges-agree-to-
adopt-financial-aid-shopping-sheet/.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(a) (1981); see also infra notes 70-75
and accompanying text.
5. See Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 84 (1993) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court opined
that a buyer who had exclusive information, which was about to be made public and that would
substantially affect the price of a commodity, was not required to inform the seller as long as the
buyer did nothing to deceive the seller."); see also Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195
(1817) ("The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of [material] extrinsic circumstances
2013]
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fraud or misrepresentation, how should parties conduct themselves
before a contract is executed? Is passive honesty enough, or do we owe
positive disclosure obligations to our contracting counterparts? More to
the point, when is it appropriate to impose a duty to disclose material
facts upon parties contemplating a contractual relationship?
The general rule is that parties do not owe one another any duty of
disclosure before a contract is in place. In certain circumstances, both
common law and statutory law have deviated from this general rule.
However, these decisions and statutes are largely reactive: an ineffi-
ciency is identified in a certain transaction's precontractual period and
disclosure is mandated to remedy such inefficiency. These reactive
measures, although helpful, are insufficient. Ideally, lawmakers could
identify such problems in a more proactive manner, as inefficiencies in
many contractual relationships have negative effects that extend beyond
the contracting parties. For example, some have argued that the Great
Recession would have been mitigated (or avoided altogether) if the
financial industry were subject to mandates of greater disclosure.6
Therefore, it should be no surprise that precontractual disclosure is a
... which was exclusively within the knowledge of [one party], ought to have been communicated
by him to the [other party]? The court is of [the] opinion that he was not bound to communicate
it."); Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991); Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin.
Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282-83 (2nd Cir. 1975); see also generally Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Low of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1978).
6. Although the blame for the Great Recession may be placed upon many industries and
players, there is little doubt that predatory lending (spurred on by the securitization of mortgages)
played a major role. See Nick Carey, Racial Predatory Loans Fueled by U.S. Housing Crisis:
Study, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.reuters.comarticle/2010/10/04/us-usa-foreclosures-
race-idUSTRE6930K520101004 ("Predatory lending aimed at racially segregated minority
neighborhoods led to mass foreclosures that fueled the U.S. housing crisis ...."). The primary
weapon to combat predatory lending is mandated disclosures. See, e.g., About Predatory Lending,
WASH. ST. DEPARTMENT FIN. INSTrrUTIONS (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumers/
predlendwp.htm (emphasizing the importance of disclosures in avoiding predatory lending by
noting that "disclosures are required to be provided at two major points in the mortgage
transaction" and advising to avoid business with a lender or broker "[i]f disclosures are not
provided [at these two points]"). Beyond predatory lending, disclosures are the focus of legislation
attempting to prevent future economic crises. For example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act's preamble states that a goal of the act is to "improv[e] ...
transparency in the financial system." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]; see also
Halah Touryalai, Jamie Dimon's Testimony: Volcker Rule May Have Prevented Loss, FORBES
(June 13, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/06/13/jamie-dimons-
testimony-gets-underway-i-was-dead-wrong (noting that Jamie Dimon, chief executive and
chairman of JPMorgan Chase, "says regulators should make sure there are . . . proper
disclosures"). It should be noted, however, that some commentators do not believe that mandating
disclosure helps ameliorate the targeted issues. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 653, 665-67 (2011) (pointing out
that mandated disclosures are often impenetrable).
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core component of many of the mandates of the statute enacted to
address the Great Recession, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act").7 Given that regula-
tory agencies are currently struggling with how to structure the disclo-
sure mandates of the Dodd-Frank Act (especially in the area of securities
and securitization reform),8 the question of when it is appropriate to
mandate precontractual disclosure is a matter of compelling immediacy.
This article proposes an analytical framework for legislators to
identify when it is appropriate to mandate precontractual disclosure.
Both common law and statutory law have established exceptions to the
general rule against precontractual disclosure. Despite the fact that these
exceptions have a narrow focus and are tailored to apply to a particular
fact pattern, they share some similarities. These similarities provide the
basis to craft universally-applicable principles, which this article uses to
create the legislative framework for establishing the appropriateness of
precontractual disclosure. This framework has two factors: an analysis
of information asymmetry in the contractual relationship at issue and the
impact of the transaction on certain stakeholders. This article calls this
proposed analytical framework the "Disclosure Framework." The Dis-
closure Framework, properly applied, serves as a guide for legislators
considering the imposition of disclosure requirements.
As background, Part I of this article discusses the default rule: par-
ties to a negotiation do not owe one another a duty of precontractual
disclosure. This section also explores the theoretical justification for the
default rule, freedom of contract, before addressing how certain infor-
mation asymmetries present problems for the default rule. Part II pro-
poses and describes the two factors of the Disclosure Framework: the
analysis of information asymmetry in the contractual relationship at
issue and an analysis of the stakeholder interest in imposing precontrac-
tual disclosure in the target transaction. Part III discusses both common
law and statutory exceptions to the default rule against precontractual
disclosure, drawing parallels between these exceptions and revealing
how these parallels are reflected in the Disclosure Framework's two fac-
tors. Part IV illustrates the application of the Disclosure Framework by
7. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § I 100F (amending section 615(h) of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act to require certain disclosures if a credit score is used in making the credit decision); see also
id. § 932 (requiring disclosures by credit rating agencies, which include disclosure of conflicts of
interest, historical rating performance data, and detailed rating methodologies).
8. See, e.g., Enhanced Oversight After the Financial Crisis: The Wall Street Reform Act at
One Year: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 59
(2011) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 112shrg72700/pdf/CHRG- 112shrg72700.pdf
(noting that "the [Dodd-Frank] Act directs the SEC to write a large number of rules necessary to
implement the Act," which includes "more than 90 mandatory rulemaking provisions").
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analyzing the hypothetical described at this article's outset and discusses
whether the Disclosure Framework analysis recommends precontractual
disclosure in the student loan context.
I. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE LIMITS OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
9
Before discussing the Disclosure Framework and identifying poten-
tial transactions in which the imposition of precontractual disclosure is
appropriate, it is important to establish that the default rule does not
require precontractual disclosure between contracting parties and to dis-
cuss the theoretical foundation of the default rule, freedom of contract.
This section will then address the problem with the default rule, which is
that most contractual relationships suffer from information asymmetry,
before exploring the nuanced balance at play between information asym-
metry and freedom of contract.
A. No Duty of Precontractual Disclosure
In the absence of a statutory mandate regarding precontractual dis-
closure, one is tempted to look to the duty of good faith and fair dealing
imposed upon all commercial transactions by the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC")1° and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Restate-
ment")."I It is conceivable that the definition of good faith, the default
rule that governs contracting parties, might include precontractual obli-
gations. Unfortunately, neither the UCC nor the Restatement provides a
particularly satisfying definition of "good faith."'" This failure is not
peculiar to the drafters of the UCC or the Restatement, as the process of
defining "good faith" has proven to be a frustrating endeavor and it
9. This section's title pays homage to Michael Trebilcock's seminal work, MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993).
10. The UCC definitively states that "[elvery contract or duty [under the UCC] imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-304 (2012). The UCC
has been adopted by every state. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008
U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (2008) (noting "[t]he universal adoption of the U.C.C. (at least in some
form) by all fifty states"). The UCC has different standards of good faith for merchants. See
Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100
HARV. L. REV. 465, 524 n.258 (1987). However, this distinction has no bearing on the arguments
of this article.
11. The Restatement, with similar conclusiveness, states that "[e]very contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). The Restatement describes "good faith" as
"faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party." Id. § 205 cmt. a. For the purposes of this article, it is not important to determine if
the UCC or the Restatement would apply to the transaction at issue.
12. The UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (2012).
[Vol. 67:553
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remains a fairly nebulous concept. 3 So much, in fact, that Professor
Robert Summers has suggested that "the very idea of good faith ... is
simply not the kind of idea that is susceptible of . . . a definitional
approach."14 Professor Summers continues to state that "[m]any com-
mentators suggest that they are willing to accept that good faith cannot,
as such, be usefully defined in terms of a single, general, positive mean-
ing.""5 Beyond definitional difficulties, even if the duty of good faith
required some level of disclosure (a notion that is debatable), the duty of
good faith would not govern any precontractual period.16 This is, per-
haps, reasonable. Individuals enter into contracts on a near daily basis,
and thus, in some sense, everyone is in a precontractual period at any
given moment. At what point does an individual's consideration of a
contractual relationship rise to a sufficient level to be considered precon-
tractual? This issue may have convinced the drafters of the UCC and the
Restatement to steer clear of any period in which a contract is not in
place.
However, even if one were to clearly define the precontractual
period (for example, as this article does, as the period beginning at the
point in which a party evinces an intent to enter into a negotiation and
ending upon either execution of a contract or a party ceasing negotia-
tions) and impose a duty of good faith upon such period, it is not clear
that the duty of good faith would impose a duty of disclosure.' 7 This is
generally true even when one party knows something that the other party
does not. 18 This is justified largely by the theory of freedom of
13. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818 (1982) ("[Slome words and phrases do not have
a general positive meaning of their own within the contexts or realms of discourse in which they
are at home.").
14. Id. at 830.
15. Id. at 829.
16. Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure
in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 381, 382 n.3 (1978) ("[The U.C.C. and the
Restatement do not extend [good faith] to the bargaining stage of contract formation .... ").
However, some scholars suggest that this is not necessarily the case. See Palmieri, supra note 5, at
125 (arguing that the exceptions to the general rule that parties do not have a duty of
precontractual disclosure have rendered the general rule almost entirely inapplicable); see also
Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed?-Doubting the Demise of Caveat Emptor,
55 MD. L. REV. 387, 389 (1996) (noting "the nationwide erosion of the common-law doctrine of
caveat emptor in transactions in real property"). In addition, a minority of courts have held that the
UCC requirement of good faith extends to negotiations. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Anderson,
No. 0053810, 1991 WL 204359, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991).
17. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law ("The
precise contours of the duty to bargain in good faith are not entirely clear."), in 1 HANDBOOK OF
LAW & ECONOMICS 3, 66 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
18. See id.; KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 124 (1988).
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contract. 9
B. Freedom of Contract
Freedom of contract has been described, with no intended hyper-
bole, as "the foundation of contract law."2 Freedom of contract is, in the
simplest of terms, the absolute right of parties to decide to contract (or
not contract) with one another and to determine the terms of such con-
tract.21 This theory places a primacy upon private ordering, and argues
against outside regulation of contracts. The freedom of contract theory
assumes that "contracts that support legitimate economic exchange are
at least presumptively enforceable,"22 and posits that courts, legislators,
and other regulators should generally avoid investigating such con-
tracts.23 This is not only because regulation is an affront to the con-
tracting parties' right to order their affairs, but also because of the
assumption that parties will, if acting rationally, reach an agreement that
represents the most efficient use of the respective parties' goods or serv-
ices." In sum, freedom of contract is "the idea, fundamental in the
orthodox understanding of contract law, that the content of a contractual
obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law."25
As a normative theory, freedom of contract enjoys wide support.26
The economic justification for freedom of contract, for example, lies in
the assumption that individuals will act in their own best interests, and
third parties should therefore refrain from imposing their judgment upon
a privately-ordered arrangement.27 In addition to the economic justifica-
19. See Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 17, at 18 ("The threshold issue in any
discussion of contract law is freedom of contract-the extent to which the law sanctions the use of
contracts as a commitment device.").
20. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 669, 684 (2010).
21. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv.
561, 619, 625 (1983). "Freedom of contract has two distinct dimensions: The first-freedom from
contract-stipulates that persons should not have contractual obligations imposed on them without
their consent. The second-freedom to contract-stipulates that persons should have the power to
alter by consent their legal relations." Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as
Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1023-24 (1992) (footnote omitted).
22. See Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 17, at 19.
23. See TuBmILCOCK, supra note 9, at 2-8.
24. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of
Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 708 (2012).
25. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRAcT THEORY 59 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
26. As explained by Professor Robert Hillman, "the centrality of contractual freedom in
American jurisprudence derives in part from society's fervent respect for individual freedom and
strong faith in limited government." ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRAcT LAW 9
(1997) (footnote omitted).
27. See id. This rather pithy statement belies the voluminous economic arguments laid out in
favor of freedom of contract. For a more nuanced and complete discussion of the economic
[Vol. 67:553
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tion, support for freedom of contract also has a political justification, in
that an individual's freedom to privately order his or her affairs places
the highest value on such individual's consent (or for that matter, his or
her right not to consent) to any given transaction.28 Freedom of contract
adherents also cite a social justice justification, noting that the freedom
of contract has the power to liberate parties from "traditional inequality
and immobility" by giving each individual the equal right to freely
determine the terms of his or her agreements.29 In addition, freedom of
contract also enjoys the support of instrumentalists (arguing that free-
dom of contract results in the highest use of property)30 and moralists
(arguing that freedom of contract supports the moral justifications for
enforcing contracts).31
Despite the broad support in favor of freedom of contract, many of
its justifications rely upon each party having a certain level of access to
information. Equal access to information, however, is seldom found in
contracting relationships.32 As discussed below, the existence of infor-
mation asymmetry in many contracting relationships presents some
problems for the freedom of contract theory.
C. Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry exists whenever a party to a contract does
not enjoy the same level of access to information as the party's con-
tracting counterpart.3 3 If each party enjoys equal access to the fact at
issue, there is no need to require disclosure. However, equal access is
rarely the case, and information asymmetry is the norm, not the excep-
tion. Practically every agreement will suffer from some imbalance in
information because absolute information symmetry is virtually impossi-
ble to obtain. As illustrated by Professor Michael Trebilcock:
Almost no exchanges are entered into with absolutely perfect infor-
mation by both parties. Even the purchase of the morning newspaper
arguments in favor of freedom of contract, see Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 17, at
21-30.
28. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 9, at 8 ("Private ordering is the quintessential form of
government with the consent of the governed.").
29. HILLMAN, supra note 26, at 11 (quoting Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Some Reflections on
Status and Freedom, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 222, 236 (Ralph
A. Newman ed., 1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 11-12 ("Free contracting ... enables goods and services to move 'from less to more
valuable uses.' ") (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (3d ed. 1986)).
31. Id. at 12 (noting that "the moral obligation from making a promise is the key to contract
enforcement") (citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 17 (1981)). This is by no means an exhaustive list of the support for freedom of
contract. For a more complete discussion, see TREBICOCK, supra note 9, at 2-8.
32. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 9, at 103.
33. See id. at 102-26.
2013]
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in the local variety store on the assumption that it will contain an
interesting film or restaurant review, when this assumption turns out
to be false, reflects an exchange entered into with incomplete
information.34
This virtual ubiquity of information asymmetry may at first appear
troubling. Intuitive notions of "fair play and due process" suggest that
contracts where information asymmetry is great should not be enforcea-
ble.35 However, information asymmetry plays a vital function in the
marketplace, and it should not be eliminated without good cause.
The primary defense of information asymmetry is economic. Infor-
mation is not free. As such, an economically rational society should
fashion a regulatory environment which rewards those who invest in
information discovery. A familiar illustration of this argument is the
hypothetical in which a prospector incurs various expenses to investigate
a piece of farmland.3 6 After engaging in costly studies and measure-
ments, the prospector determines there is a high likelihood of a precious
mineral under the land.37 Upon this discovery, the prospector makes an
offer to buy the land at a price based upon the land's use as farmland
(i.e., without consideration of the value of the minerals).38 If the pros-
pector's investigation proves correct and minerals exist under the land,
the prospector would reap a great profit, thereby justifying the investiga-
tion's expense.39
If a regulatory environment removed all information asymmetry,
the prospector would not reap such benefit. If, for example, regulations
required disclosure to remedy information symmetry in the hypothetical,
the prospector would be forced to disclose the results of his investigation
(the probability of minerals under the land), and the farmer, assuming
economic rationality, would demand a higher price. This "effectively
deprives [the prospector] of any economic return on his investments in
acquiring the information."4 Thus, if mandatory disclosure were a
default requirement, it is likely that the prospector would not engage in
any investigation because of the related expenses. Ultimately, the miner-
34. See id. at 103.
35. Cf Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TUL. L. REv. 1519, 1531 (2010) ("[D]ue process requires 'fair
warning,' which in the context of criminal law means that citizens can be punished only for
violating laws on the books .... But, of course, people rarely read or understand most criminal
statutes.").
36. See TREBLCOCK, supra note 9, at 108.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 109.
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als would not be discovered, the land would continue as farmland, and
the highest possible economic use of the land would not be realized.
This hypothetical illustrates how information asymmetry provides
an incentive for individuals to undertake the expenses of information
collection. However, despite the argument that mandated disclosure
might devalue information and may disincentivize both information
gathering and the highest potential use of property, there are instances in
which mandating disclosure is proper. This occurs when information
asymmetries are so great that they challenge the justifications of free-
dom of contract and overcome the rationale of incentivizing information
gathering.
1. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND INFORMATION SYMMETRY
Pure freedom of contract theory promotes individual authority to
structure and commit to agreements without regulatory burdens. But
most freedom of contract justifications founder when faced with the
reality of information asymmetry. This is because the natural conse-
quences of information asymmetry undermine the freedom of contract
justifications. For example, in the presence of an information imbalance,
a party may agree to unanticipated inefficiencies (upsetting freedom of
contract's assumption that the private arrangement is the best use of the
parties' goods or services)," enter into an agreement without fully con-
templating the implications (undermining the purported political justifi-
cations of freedom of contract),42 or enter into an agreement with false
assumptions of the exchanged value (virtually eliminating any chance
that the agreement will serve freedom of contract's social justice pur-
pose).43 These results are troubling to many freedom of contract adher-
ents; as Professor Trebilcock notes, "[e]ven the most committed
proponents of free markets and freedom of contract recognize that cer-
tain information preconditions" are required to achieve freedom of con-
tract's promised efficiencies.44
Despite these issues, some commentators argue that information
asymmetry does not pose any problems for freedom of contract. Indeed,
some argue that information asymmetry is as necessary as it is perva-
sive. This argument posits that a legal system which has eliminated all
information asymmetries is a false utopia, promising potential peril. Pro-
41. See HLLMAN, supra note 26, at 11-12.
42. See id. at 9-10.
43. See id. at 11.
44. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 9, at 102. To make his point, Professor Trebilcock cites
Milton Friedman's statement that "[tlhe possibility of coordination through voluntary cooperation
rests on the elementary-yet frequently denied-proposition that both parties to an economic
transaction benefit from it, provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed." Id.
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fessor Roberto Mangabeira Unger argues that "a commitment to cancel
out every inequality of power or knowledge as soon as it arose would
also undermine a contract system. 45 As Professor Unger explains:
Real markets are never just machines for instantaneous transactions
among economic agents equally knowledgeable and equally able to
await the next offer or to withdraw from current courses of dealing.
Continued success in market transactions shows partly in the buildup
of advantages of power or knowledge that enable their beneficiaries
to do that much better in the next round of transactions. If everyone
were quickly restored to a situation of equality within the market
order, the method responsible for this restoration .... would empty
market transactions of much of their apparent significance.46
Thus, Professor Unger argues that information asymmetries are not only
a reality of markets, but are a necessity for market survival.47 From this
perspective, elimination of information asymmetry would not only rob
private actors of their right to privately order their agreements, but it
would also prove disastrous to a market-based system.
2. ELIMINATING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY SUPPORTS
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Professor Unger's arguments notwithstanding, certain information
asymmetries pose problems for freedom of contract adherents because
they belie the assumption that the parties are freely entering into a con-
tract.4 8 For a theory with a basis in individual freedom, this presents a
challenge. Information asymmetry in the contracting relationship
"impairs one's ability to make decisions of the fully rational kind postu-
lated in economic discourse."49 In essence, a decision made without
some minimum level of information will not support the efficiency argu-
ments of freedom of contract because the party without such information
did not, in effect, make a decision. Or as more succinctly posited by
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele, information "is a precondition of
choice."50 Professor Scheppele continues to explain that "one needs a
certain amount of information in order to be able to imagine one's alter-
natives, to understand enough of their implications to be able to distin-
guish among them, and to assess which one would best realize one's
aims."" In other words, if information asymmetries have rendered it
45. See Unger, supra note 21, at 626.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See EiAN MACKAAY, ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND LAW 107 (1980).
49. Id.
50. SCHEPPELE, supra, note 18, at 25.
51. Id.
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impossible for a party to make an informed decision, then such party
enters into the contract without making a true choice. This "decision" to
enter into a contract, therefore, is no decision at all, and is counter to
freedom of contract principles.52
With all due respect to Professor Unger, this article adheres to Pro-
fessor Scheppele's argument that some form of information balance is
necessary to have true freedom of contract. This maxim suggests that a
disclosure regime that selectively reduces information asymmetry is not
necessarily counter to freedom of contract. By ensuring equality of
information in certain relationships, precontractual disclosure gives the
contracting parties the right to make an informed decision concerning
the agreement.
II. THE DISCLOSuRE FRAMEWORK
Given the threats posed by information asymmetry, it should not be
surprising that courts and legislatures have often departed from the gen-
eral rule against any duty of precontractual disclosure. Common law dis-
closure obligations have been established by more than two centuries of
caselaw, and statutory disclosure obligations can be found in some of the
most fundamental of regulatory statutes. These exceptions serve as proof
that the general rule against mandated disclosure is not appropriate in all
circumstances. At first blush, these exceptions to the general rule appear
fact-specific and narrow. However, upon closer inspection, the excep-
tions have similarities that may be distilled into general principles,
which may be used to craft a more universal rule. This universal rule,
explained in more detail below, serves as an analytical framework for
legislators to use when considering the imposition of precontractual dis-
closure upon a particular relationship. This framework involves first
analyzing the information asymmetry in the contractual relationship and
then identifying and weighing the stakeholder interest in promoting
precontractual disclosure in the particular transaction (the "Disclosure
Framework").
A. Step One: The Information Asymmetry Analysis
The first step of the Disclosure Framework is an analysis of the
information asymmetry between the contracting parties. Generally
speaking, the focus of this analysis is on the ability of the parties to
access the fact to be disclosed. This factor has an intuitive appeal: If a
fact is readily accessible to both parties, where is the need for mandated
disclosure? Indeed, if a material fact is neither in the sole possession of a
52. See supra notes 26, 35 and accompanying text.
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party nor difficult for either party to unveil, then a compelling argument
to require disclosure is difficult to make.53
At the other extreme, the mere existence of information asymmetry
should not satisfy the first step of the Disclosure Framework because
information asymmetry exists at some level in virtually every contrac-
tual relationship. 54 Given this near ubiquity, the first step would be an
irrelevant formality if any amount of information asymmetry satisfied
the inquiry. Rather, this analysis uses a modified version of the equal
access analysis proposed by Professor Scheppele 5 As set forth by Pro-
fessor Scheppele, the inquiry relies upon the parties' equal access to
material information. 6 Equal access exists when the parties have "equal
probabilities of finding the information if they put in the same level of
effort. ' 57 As explained by Professor Scheppele:
[T]wo people would be said to have equal access to today's headlines
because each could buy a newspaper, turn on the radio, watch the
television, or listen to conversation on the street. Given equal levels
of effort, the two people could probably discover the news .... This
does not mean that the two people will have the same information
(one may prefer to listen to a baseball game; another may have too
many other obligations to pay much attention to the news). But
should each actor want to know the news, each would have to put in
roughly the same effort to acquire it . . . .Equal access does not
require that effort will always be successful; it only requires that
equal effort is rewarded with equal probabilities of success. 58
In situations in which the contracting parties do not have such equal
access, the information asymmetry is high enough to justify moving on
to the second step of the Disclosure Framework, the stakeholder
analysis.
53. See Palmieri, supra note 5, at 76 ("[Alrguing [for a duty of precontractual disclosure]
does not mean to suggest that the parties ought to forego their own independent investigation of
the facts. While such an investigation may impact on the duty of disclosure, it is always advisable
to be as informed as possible before entering any transaction." (footnote omitted)).
54. See TREBULCOCK, supra note 9, at 103.
55. For Professor Scheppele's equal access analysis, see generally SCHEPPELE, supra note 18,
at 119-124.
56. See id. at 119-20.
57. Id. at 120. The first step in the Disclosure Analysis, however, does not include Professor
Scheppele's inquiry into the capability of each party to expend the equivalent level of effort. See
id. This is not intended to devalue this step, but is rather to maintain the focus on the operative
inquiry for the Disclosure Analysis: equal probability of discovery given equal effort expended.
Capability of the parties is certainly an issue, but not one addressed by this article.
58. Id. Professor Scheppele continues to state that "[o]ne person's lucky break does not
interfere with equal access as long as the other person with whom she deals has faced the same
chance of a fortuitous fate." Id.
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B. Step Two: The Stakeholder Analysis
As noted above, information asymmetry will exist, at some level, in
virtually every contractual relationship. Even when limited by the first
step of the Disclosure Analysis, many contracting relationships will suf-
fer from some level of information asymmetry. Some of these relation-
ships are not ideal candidates for imposing precontractual disclosure (if,
for example, the information asymmetries in such relationships support
freedom of contract principles). Thus, the Disclosure Framework
requires a limiting principle to specifically identify the instances of
information asymmetry which are counter to freedom of contract. This
principle must operate to limit the application of the Disclosure Frame-
work when, despite the information asymmetry in a particular contrac-
tual relationship, there is not a strong enough public interest in imposing
precontractual disclosure. This limiting principle directly addresses
whether lawmakers are the proper actors to require precontractual dis-
closure. In other words, the inquiry is whether the transaction is "so far
affected with a public interest as to justify legislative regulation. ' '59
Of course, before one can weigh the public interest,6" one must
settle upon a definition. Unfortunately, the definition of public interest is
neither obvious nor self-evident. Rather, public interest is a malleable6"
concept often molded to match the desires of the speaker.62 One may be
tempted to resort to the definition proposed by Black's Law Dictionary,
which confidently states that public interest is "[t]he general welfare of
the public that warrants recognition and protection."63 This definition,
however, fails to provide a reliable manner in which to weigh public
interest. After all, the "general welfare of the public" is ever-present,
albeit in differing degrees. Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that
"the public interest is concerned in every transaction between men," and
that it permeates "the sum of the transactions constituting the activities
of life."' 64 To put a finer point on it, the definition of "public interest"
59. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 406 (1914).
60. The caselaw that weighs public interest is not exceedingly helpful. For example the
Northeast Utilities Service Company v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission court states rather
cryptically, presumably in an attempt to clarify the proper means to weigh the public interest, that
"[i]t all depends on whose ox is gored and how the public interest is affected." 55 F.3d 686, 691
(1st Cir. 1995).
61. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Ties That Bind: Defining the Public Interest 2 (April
12-14, 1984) (paper presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association) ("The concept of
the public interest is elusive. Most have not attempted to define the term and those who have have
been apologetic for their efforts.").
62. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-82 (1973) ("The phrase 'public interest' ... has been
subject to conflicting interpretations, often colored by personal prejudices and predilections.").
63. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1350 (deluxe 9th ed. 2009).
64. German Alliance, 233 U.S. at 406.
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often turns on context.
For purposes of the Disclosure Framework, this article adopts a
stakeholder-based definition of public interest. 65 Under this approach,
before it is appropriate to impose precontractual disclosure obligations,
one must identify the relevant stakeholders by determining the parties
who are directly affected by the transaction. Once identified, the interest
of the stakeholder group must be weighed against the interest of the
contracting parties to define the contours of their agreement.
The only pertinent stakeholder interest for this factor of the Disclo-
sure Framework is an interest in encouraging precontractual disclosure.
Any other articulated interest will not suffice. The target transaction is,
after all, a private agreement between private parties, and lawmakers
should not lightly intervene in such transactions. 66 Or as stated by Pro-
fessor Roscoe Pound, "unless some countervailing interest must come
into account which would be sacrificed in the process, it would seem
that the individual interest in promised advantages should be secured to
the full extent of what has been assured to him by the deliberate promise
of another.'67 This countervailing interest is the stakeholder group's
interest in promoting precontractual disclosure in the transaction-that
is, the stakeholder group's interest in increasing efficiency in the trans-
action by reducing information asymmetry. Put another way, the stake-
holder interest is great enough to satisfy the second step of the
Disclosure Framework when the interests of third-party stakeholders in
encouraging efficiency in the transaction significantly outweigh the
interests of the contracting parties' desire to use information asymme-
tries as negotiating leverage.
The first step in the stakeholder analysis is identifying all parties
that are directly affected by the transaction that have an interest in pro-
moting precontractual disclosure in the transaction. These parties make
up the stakeholder group. The next step is to weigh (i) the costs suffered
by the stakeholder group if precontractual disclosure were not imposed
against (ii) the costs suffered by the party forced to disclose.68 As with
65. This approach is, in part, identified by taking cues from the precontractual disclosure
statutes discussed below. See discussion infra Part III.
66. See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW
137 (1981) ("The interference in private lives cannot be justified on grounds of state
interest ....").
67. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
68. It may be apparent that this prong of the Disclosure Framework is not immune to
manipulation. Clearly, the impact upon stakeholders is highly dependent on both how one defines
a stakeholder and how one measures the transaction's impact upon such stakeholders. The specter
of manipulation, however, should not cast doubt upon the utility of the Disclosure Framework.
Given that this test is proposed for use by lawmakers, some flexibility in its applicability is ideal.
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other concepts that pose definitional difficulties,69 it might be more illu-
minating to explain this factor by discussing examples.
III. THE BASIS OF THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK: EXCEPTIONS TO
THE RULE AGAINST PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE
The default rule against the imposition of precontractual disclosure
has many exceptions. These exceptions, whether imposed by courts or
legislators, exhibit similarities which provide a foundation for the Dis-
closure Framework. As discussed in this section, each exception justifies
precontractual disclosure because the transaction at issue suffered from
an information asymmetry (i.e., the parties did not enjoy equal access to
the fact to be disclosed), and the harm suffered by the stakeholder group
due to nondisclosure outweighed the harm suffered by the party forced
to disclose. In other words, each of the exceptions to the default rule
meets the requirements of the two factors of the Disclosure Framework.
The discussion in this section will prove that the Disclosure Framework
is not only theoretically sound, but is also consistent with current statu-
tory and common law departures from the default rule. This section will
discuss a common law exception (the imposition of precontractual dis-
closure in marine insurance contracts), a federal statutory exception (the
precontractual disclosures required in certain sales of private securities),
and an exception first addressed by courts and later codified by a state
legislature (the duty of a seller or broker to disclose certain facts to a
potential homebuyer).
A. Common Law Exceptions to the General Rule
The general rule that there is no duty of precontractual disclosure7 °
has a number of common law exceptions. These exceptions include a
duty to disclose facts (i) to avoid active concealment;7' (ii) to correct
previously made material representations;72 (iii) to ensure that any dis-
69. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
70. See Holmes, supra note 16, at 447 (noting "the general rule requiring no disclosure").
71. See Klott v. Assocs. Real Estate, 322 N.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (noting
"a duty imposed by law to speak" in the presence of "a dangerous latent defect in the property not
readily discoverable by the vendee" and suggesting that, "[b]y way of example, if there be a
contaminated well, known to the vendor and undisclosed to the vendee, the concealment of such
may well constitute actionable fraud"); see also Holman v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc.,
972 So. 2d 564, 568 (Miss. 2008) ("The duty to disclose is based upon a theory of fraud that
recognizes that the failure of a party to a business transaction to speak may amount to a
suppression of a material fact which should have been disclosed and is, in effect, fraud.").
72. See Stewart v. Wyo. Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888) (noting that if a party
"fraudulently produc[es] a false impression upon the mind of the other party... it is unimportant
whether the means of accomplishing it are words or acts of the defendant, or his concealment or
suppression of material facts not equally within the knowledge or reach of the plaintiff.").
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closures voluntarily given are complete and full; 73 (iv) in certain special
relationships; 74 and (v) to ensure a party is not acting upon a mistaken
understanding of such information. In addition to these exceptions,
courts have imposed a duty of precontractual disclosure in certain indus-
tries. This section focuses on the oldest example of a common law impo-
sition of precontractual disclosure, the judicially-imposed duty to
disclose material facts in marine insurance contracts. Analysis of this
duty will illustrate that the common law justifications for imposing
precontractual disclosure in marine insurance contracts mirror the fac-
tors of the Disclosure Framework: information asymmetry and a strong
stakeholder group interest in promoting disclosure in the contractual
relationship.
1. PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE IN MARINE
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Both American and British courts have deviated from the general
rule by imposing precontractual disclosure in certain insurance con-
tracts. More specifically, when dealing with marine insurance contracts,
court decisions have held that parties must disclose material facts before
the insurance contract is in place. 76 This requirement allows contracting
parties to void contracts completely if the other party fails to disclose
material facts prior to contract execution, regardless of intent. Despite
the lack of a scienter requirement and the potentially harsh conse-
quences, courts have largely fallen in line to develop a fairly reliable
definition for the doctrine: a material misrepresentation or omission,
whether or not in response to a specific inquiry, renders the insurance
contract voidable. The marine insurance industry has been subject to this
requirement of precontractual disclosure for nearly two and a half centu-
73. See Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287, 289 (Ky. 1908) ("[Tlhere are times and occasions
when it is the duty of a person to speak in order that the party he is dealing with may be placed on
an equal footing with him as when the knowledge he possesses is not within the fair and
reasonable reach of the other .... ").
74. See Stewart v. Phx. Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937) ("It is the general rule of
law that, where a relation of trust or confidence exists between two parties so that one of them
places peculiar reliance in the trustworthiness of another, the latter is under a duty to make a full
and truthful disclosure of all material facts .... ).
75. U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
("[A] duty to disclose arises where one party possesses superior knowledge not readily available
to the other and that party knows the other is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge."); see
also Janel World Trade, Ltd. v. World Logistics Servs., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 1327(RJS), 2009 WL
735072, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2009) ("A duty to disclose between negotiating parties arises
... where one party has superior knowledge of certain information, that information is not readily
available to the other party, and the first party knows that the second party is acting on the basis of
mistaken knowledge." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. See Carter v. Boehm (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B.) 1164; 3 Burr. 1905, 1909.
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ries.7 7 Initially, this requirement was justified under the concept of uber-
rimae fides,7 8 or utmost good faith, first established in Carter v.
Boehm.79
Carter involved Fort Marlborough, a structure built by the British
East India Company on the island of Sumatra in the East Indies.8" The
fort's governor, Mr. Carter, wary of an attack by French forces, pur-
chased an insurance policy from Mr. Boehm against "its being taken by
a foreign enemy."81 The fort was, in fact, later taken by a French expedi-
tionary force.82 Mr. Carter attempted to collect on the policy, and Mr.
Boehm balked, arguing that Mr. Carter was aware that the fort was not
"designed to resist European enemies" (i.e., the French) but was "only
calculated for defen[s]e against the natives of the island of Sumatra."83
Mr. Boehm argued that this fact should have been disclosed.84
The Carter court, applying utmost good faith,85 held that Mr.
Carter, the policy holder, was obligated to disclose all facts that would
materially affect the risk taken by Mr. Boehm,86 the insurer, even in the
absence of fraudulent intent or knowledge. 87 Thus, the Carter court
77. The requirement was born in common law and later codified in various statutes. See
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 17 (Eng.); Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
78. Other spellings that have been used are "uberrima fides" and "uberrimae fidei." See
Holmes, supra note 16, at 409.
79. See id. (noting that the concept of "uberrimae fidei can generally be traced to Lord
Mansfield's opinion in Carter v. Boehm").
80. Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163.
81. Id. The policy was actually entered into by the governor's brother, on behalf of the
governor. Id. at 1162-63.
82. Id. at 1163. Rather dramatically, the court noted that "[t]he event happened: the fort was
taken, by Count D'Estaigne, within the year." Id. The Court noted that "a French man of war"
overtook the fort with "64 guns and a frigate of twenty guns." Id. at 1166.
83. Id. at 1163. The court noted that it was "proved without contradiction" that the fort was
"not established for a place of arms or defen[s]e against the attacks of a[ ] European enemy; but
merely for the purpose of trade, and of defen[s]e against the natives." Id. at 1166.
84. Id. at 1166. Presumably, the French boasted more advanced weaponry.
85. Curiously, the court's opinion does not mention either "uberrimaefidei" or "utmost good
faith." However, the Carter opinion is widely held to have hinged upon the doctrine. See, e.g.,
John Lowry, Whither the Duty of Good Faith in UK Insurance Contracts, 16 CONN. iNS. L.J. 97,
107 (2009) ("It is striking that throughout [the court's] judgments on the issue of non-disclosure
[the court] avoided the terminology of 'utmost' good faith. Yet section 17 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906, the preamble of which declares it to be a codifying statute, states that insurance is
uberrimae fidei.").
86. Curiously, this obligation did not lead the court to hold in favor of the insurer despite the
court noting that "The keeping back of [material facts] is a fraud, and therefore the policy is void;
because the ris[k] run is really different from the ris[k] understood and intended to be run, at the
time of the agreement." Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
87. Id. at 1164 ("Although the suppression should happen through mistake, without any
fraudulent intention; yet still the [insurer] is deceived .... ). At first blush, this duty may appear
to place an undue burden upon the insured, as the insurer appears to bear no duty to investigate.
However, later cases clarified that an insurer has a duty to investigate and may not rely upon
unreasonable ignorance. See, e.g., Noble v. Kennoway, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B.) 327, 2
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imposed a precontractual duty to disclose material facts in marine insur-
ance contracts. 88 This precontractual duty has survived to this day.89
Not unlike other areas of jurisprudence, American courts adopted
the British common law imposition of precontractual disclosure in
marine insurance contracts. The first definitive statement on the doctrine
of utmost good faith in American jurisprudence was the Supreme
Court's decision in the case of M'Lanahan v. Universal Insurance Co.90
In M'Lanahan, the court assertively states that "[t]he contract of insur-
ance has been said to be a contract uberrimae fidei, and the principles
which govern it, are those of an enlightened moral policy."'" In impos-
ing a precontractual duty to disclose facts, the M'Lanahan court fol-
lowed the Carter court's refusal to impose a scienter requirement and
noted that "even if there be no intentional fraud, still the underwriter has
a right to a disclosure of all material facts ... and the omission is fatal"
to the contract.92
The following sections will reveal that if the Disclosure Framework
were in use at the time of the Carter decision, the court's analysis would
result in the same outcome. This is because (i) the information asymme-
try analysis of the Disclosure Framework mirrors the Carter court's con-
cerns about the actions of the parties, and (ii) the stakeholder analysis
reveals that the harm of mandated disclosure to the insurer is much
lower than the harm of nondisclosure suffered by the stakeholder group.
2. THE MARINE INSURANCE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ANALYSIS
Under the Disclosure Framework, information asymmetry will only
give rise to precontractual disclosure obligations if parties to the transac-
tion do not have equal access. Equal access is satisfied when each party
has an equal probability of discovering the information if such party
Doug. 510, 513 ("Every [insurer] is presumed to be acquainted with the practice of the trade he
insures ..... If he does not know it, he ought to inform himself.").
88. See Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1164 ("The special facts ... lie most commonly in the
knowledge of the insured only: the [insurer] trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon
confidence that he does not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge."); see also Lowry,
supra note 85, at 105.
89. Although the court intended the standard of utmost good faith to apply in all commercial
transactions, later decisions limited the duty to the marine insurance industry. See id. at 98 (noting
that the Carter court "was at the time attempting to import into English commercial law the civil
law notion of good faith, but this ultimately proved unsuccessful and only survived for a very
limited class of transactions").
90. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 185 (1828); see also Columbian Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 25, 49 (1829) ("[Flair dealing requires that [the insured] should state everything
which might influence, and probably would influence, the mind of the [insurer] in forming or
declining the contract.").
91. M'Lanahan, 26 U.S. at 185.
92. Id.
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were to expend the same level of effort. 93
The lack of equal access to facts was a primary motivating factor
for the Carter court's decision to impose precontractual disclosure in
insurance contracts. Indeed, in the insurance market, the insured often
enjoys near exclusive access to the pertinent information: the goods to
be insured.94 This was a concern of the Carter court, as reflected by the
court's assertion that precontractual disclosure is appropriate when the
facts to be disclosed "lie most commonly in the knowledge of the
insured only."95 The Carter court held that such information should be
disclosed to the insurer prior to the contract's execution.96 The Carter
court stressed the reliance of the insurer (the information-poor party) by
noting that the insurer "trusts [the insured's] representation, and process
upon confidence that [the insured] does not keep back any circumstance
in [the insured's] knowledge."97
While a modern reader may not have much sympathy for insurers,
it is important to remember that both transportation and communication
were far more difficult in eighteenth-century England. Many marine
insurance contracts covered "cargo or ships that were often at distant
ports." 98 Insurers, therefore, could not feasibly investigate the subject
matter of an insurance policy absent a significant investment of both
money and time. To discover this information, the insurer would be
forced to deploy an investigator to travel a great distance by both land
and sea to establish that the insured property was as represented by the
insured. A requirement that the insurer personally inspect insured prop-
erty, if not impossible, would in the very least impose a great expense
upon the insurer.99 The information asymmetry in marine insurance con-
93. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 18, at 120, 124.
94. Similarly, the reinsurance market imposes a precontractual duty to disclose material
information regarding the reinsured's risk because "[t]he knowledge of the risk, both in the
disclosure of material information used to set the premium, and in the actual administration of the
contract, lies with the ceding insurer" as opposed to the reinsurer. Steven W. Thomas, Note,
Utmost Good Faith in Reinsurance: A Tradition in Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE L.J. 1548, 1557
(1992).
The absence of utmost good faith within the reinsurance market could spawn
increased costs as reinsurers are forced either to hire their own investigative teams
to verify and thus to duplicate the assessment of the risk by the ceding insurers, or to
increase premiums to cover the greater risk. Reinsurers and ceding insurers have
depended on the principle of utmost good faith. . . to prevent wasted duplication of
effort that would result in higher premiums.
Id. at 1557-58 (footnote omitted).
95. Carter v. Boehm (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B.) 1164; 3 Burr. 1905, 1909.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1164. The Carter court emphasized the importance of accessibility by noting that
"[t]he insured need not mention what the under-writer ought to know." Id. at 1165.
98. See Thomas, supra note 94, at 1555.
99. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Inlet Fisheries Inc., 518 F.3d 645, 646 (9th
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tracts is therefore high enough to satisfy the first factor of the Disclo-
sure Framework.
3. THE MARINE INSURANCE STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
The first step in the stakeholder analysis is the identification of
potential stakeholders, or those with an interest in imposing precontrac-
tual disclosure in marine insurance contracts. In Carter, Mr. Boehm, the
insurer, has an obvious interest in imposing precontractual disclosure
(illustrated most convincingly by the fact that nondisclosure was the
basis of Mr. Boehm's defense).' 00 Mr. Boehm is therefore a stakeholder.
Given that the Carter decision imposed the duty of precontractual dis-
closure on all marine insurance contracts, 0 1 one may also justifiably
identify any potential insurer to a marine insurance contract as a stake-
holder. Further, although it may appear that insureds do not have an
interest in imposing precontractual disclosure (as the burden of disclo-
sure will fall upon their shoulders), insureds who do not wish to conceal
any facts from their insurers have an interest in imposing precontractual
disclosure because it will result in lower premium costs. This is because
any costs incurred by the insurer (including costs of paying for destruc-
tion of ill-defended forts) will likely result in higher premiums for such
customers.' The stakeholder identification process does not end at this
point, as there are additional parties directly affected by the court's man-
date. Anyone who has a stake in the economic health of the insurance
company (owners, shareholders, members, etc.) would also have a direct
stake in requiring precontractual disclosure to avoid the insurance com-
pany's payment of unanticipated losses (e.g., losses sustained by ill-
defended forts).
At this point, it may appear that the stakeholder identification pro-
cess is quite broad. One obvious concern is that an identification of a
high number of stakeholders will inevitably result in a high stakeholder
cost and the Disclosure Framework analysis will always result in impo-
sition of precontractual disclosure. To allay this concern, please note that
the remaining exceptions discussed in this section reveal a much more
limited stakeholder group. Further, the second step in the stakeholder
Cir. 2008) ( "The doctrine of uberrimaefidei was . . an economic necessity where insurers had
no reasonable means of obtaining this information efficiently, without the ubiquity of telephones,
email, digital photography, and air travel.").
100. See Carter, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1163, 1166-67.
101. Id. at 1164.
102. Cf Reed Abelson & Nina Bernstein, Health Insurers Push Premiums Sharply Higher,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2011, at Al (noting that, in the health insurance context, insurance
companies defend rising premiums because "the use and price of medical services have continued
to rise in individual and small-group plans, in part because those policies tend to have a higher
proportion of people with serious illnesses").
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analysis serves as the limiting factor. This step weighs the costs of non-
disclosure suffered by the stakeholder group against the costs suffered
by the party forced to disclose. In the marine insurance context, the
potential costs of nondisclosure to the stakeholder group include either
(i) the costs incurred by the insurance company sending an agent to
inspect the fort to discover any material issues, or (ii) the insurance com-
pany being forced to pay for unanticipated damages suffered by the fort.
On the other hand, if precontractual disclosure were imposed, the fort's
inadequate defenses would be discovered, the individual insured's insur-
ance premium would be increased,1 13 and the stakeholder group would
avoid any economic harm.1" The costs to the stakeholder group have a
much higher potential ceiling (the economic harms of paying the unan-
ticipated loss, rising insurance premiums, and increased costs of inspec-
tion) than the potential costs to the insured (the higher premium for the
individual). Therefore, the stakeholder analysis suggests that imposing
precontractual disclosure is appropriate.
B. A Federal Statutory Exception to the General Rule
As noted in the previous section, there is a well-established com-
mon law exception imposing a duty of precontractual disclosure in cer-
tain contractual relationships, and the circumstances of this exception
are in harmony with the Disclosure Framework analysis. In addition to
common law, there are many instances in which the federal government
has imposed similar duties."' This section will discuss one specific
instance: the regulation of private securities sales. The following section
will examine the justifications for the precontractual disclosure mecha-
nism in the sales of private securities and demonstrate how the mecha-
nism satisfies the Disclosure Framework analysis.
1. THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SALES OF SECURITIES
Throughout the late nineteenth century and the early decades of the
twentieth century, business financing in America grew at an erratic and
103. Or more likely, the fort would not have been insured.
104. A member of the stakeholder group could cancel the insurance and select a different
insurance carrier. However, this creates more inefficiency, as every person required to buy
insurance would be required to inquire as to the company's investigatory policies.
105. See Palmieri, supra note 5, at 139 ("Some statutes require disclosures in certain contexts."
(citing UNIF. SALES AcT, 3A U.L.A. 452 (1906); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1988); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607(c) (1988); Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. 111 1992); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1982 & Supp. IV 1992); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1988); Truth in Negotiations Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1988); Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988))).
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unsustainable pace. 10 6 Although warnings existed, 117 proposed federal
regulations were unpopular and garnered little support.'0 8 Left unregu-
lated, the United States securities markets virtually collapsed in what is
commonly known as the Great Depression.10 9
The effects of the Great Depression were both far-reaching and
devastating and need not be reiterated here. The response to the crisis,
however, is of great interest to this article. The Great Depression has
been described as a "plague so sweeping that it altered expectations
about the proper relationship of law to society," and "sorely tested old
assumptions" about the superiority of "voluntary rather than governmen-
tal regulation."' 10 Thus, one imagines a fertile ground for regulation.
Given this environment, one might expect-indeed, one might
demand-a proportionally-comparable, paradigm-shifting response. The
response, though manifold, was primarily to impose disclosure require-
ments 1 before a security is sold (i.e., precontractual disclosure) through
106. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 2 (rev. ed. 1995)
("Throughout the first eight years of the 1920s, prices on the New York Stock Exchange had
approximately doubled. This was an impressive increase, but not markedly out of line with
corporate profits, which rose over 80 percent during the decade.").
107. See id. at 3 ("As early as 1925, [President] Hoover had been concerned about 'the
growing tide of speculation.' On a few occasions while he was Secretary of Commerce, Hoover
had complained to President Coolidge about the Federal Reserve Board's 'easy money policies.'
But at the time, Hoover did not care to press such views too firmly. Calvin Coolidge had achieved
his substantial popularity not by criticizing the booming economy, but by identifying himself with
it.").
108. See id. at 2 ("[A] majority of the country's voters had supported the laissez-faire
economic policies suggested by Calvin Coolidge's often-quoted remark 'This is a business
country .. . and it wants a business government.").
109. See id. at 1-2:
Between September 1, 1929, and July 1, 1932, the value of all stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange shrank from a total of nearly $90 billion to just under
$16 billion-a loss of 83 percent. In a comparable period, bonds listed on the New
York Stock Exchange declined from a value of $49 billion to $31 billion ...
During the post-World War I decade, approximately $50 billion of new securities
were sold in the United States. Approximately half or $25 billion would prove near
or totally valueless.
110. KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY
290 (2d ed. 2009).
111. Disclosure, viewed by some as a "conservative response" to the Great Depression, was
the primary tool of the Securities Acts. SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 39-40. Championed by
President Roosevelt, the required disclosure was intended to ameliorate the information imbalance
between a security's buyer and seller. See 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (President Roosevelt's
statement to Congress on federal supervision of investment securities). In endorsing the Securities
Acts, Roosevelt emphasized the importance of the disclosure requirements, noting that every sale
of securities "shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public." Id.
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the Securities Act of 1933' 12 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.13 The bulk of the disclosure requirements of these statutes con-
cern companies that sell securities on the open market (because such
companies are generally large, the trading activity of such companies is
great, and the lack of regulation of such companies was the primary
reason for the Great Depression)." 4 However, this article is more inter-
ested in the regulation of securities sales by private companies (i.e.,
those that do not offer shares on the open market).
This article focuses on private securities because the requirements
of the securities laws for such sales attempt to balance seemingly incon-
sistent goals: loosening restrictions on private companies and maintain-
ing protections of potential investors. The sale of securities' 15 by private
companies is regulated by Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D. 1" 6
In the interest of brevity, this article will restrict its discussion to issu-
ances under Rule 506, the most popular exemption.117
112. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
113. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-nn (2006). "[A] primary enduring mission of the SEC has been to compel
disclosure of data by firms involved in the securities markets .... [T]his policy has become so
well established, it is generally regarded as the appropriate or inevitable method of regulating
corporate finance." SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 39-40.
114. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006) (requiring registration with the SEC
before an issuer may sell any securities to the public); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir.
1977) ("The Securities Act of 1933 was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of
material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce." (citing Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933))).
115. Due in part to the overwhelming regulatory influence of securities laws in this area, one
may fail to consider the sale of a security as a contractual relationship. However, this relationship
is, in essence, a contract governing one party's purchase of a good from another party.
116. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-506 (2012). These rules were promulgated by the SEC under the
power granted by section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, which authorizes the SEC to exempt
any certain offerings from regulation if the SEC "finds that the enforcement ... with respect to
such securities is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason
of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering." Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1).
117. Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad)
Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAW. 919, 931 (2011) (noting that
roughly eighty percent of all private offerings that would qualify under Rules 504, 505, and 506
are made under Rule 506); see also Peter D. Fetzer et al., The JOBS Act; Rule 506 Accredited
Investor Only Offerings Likely to Be Even More Popular, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL (May 4, 2012),
http://www.martindale.com/business-law/article-Foley-Lardner-LLP_1507198.htm (noting that
Rule 506 offerings are the "most popular of the three types of non-registered offerings available
under Regulation D . . . . due to the unlimited amount of funds that could be raised for such
offerings and that state securities law registration requirements are preempted by federal law for
such offerings"). Rule 506 is a safe harbor for the exemption provided under section 4(2) of the
Securities Act, which exempts certain private securities offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a). Rule
506 was drafted to fall within this exemption, specifically noting that Rule 506 issuances "shall be
deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of
the Act." Id.
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Rule 506 allows a company to sell securities without registering
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") if the company
abides by certain rules.1" 8 Because registration with the SEC can, for
many companies, prove prohibitively expensive," 9 Rule 506 is popular
among smaller companies looking to raise funds. 2 °
Rule 506 treats sales of securities to accredited investors' 2 ' differ-
ently from sales to non-accredited investors. 22 With respect to individu-
als, an accredited investor is generally a person with sufficient net worth
to withstand a complete loss of the investment. 2 3 If any purchasers are
non-accredited, then the issuer must both reasonably believe that each
such non-accredited investor has enough business experience to be capa-
ble of evaluating the investment,124 and-most importantly for this arti-
cle-provide certain disclosures before the sale may be
consummated. 25
118. See § 230.506. Please note that the SEC is currently considering proposed amendments to
Rule 506 that would "provide that the prohibition against general solicitation and general
advertising ...would not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to Rule 506,
provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors." SEC Release No. 33-9354;
File No. S7-07-12 (Aug. 29, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2012/33-9354.
pdf. This proposed change does not affect the analysis in this article because the rule maintains the
distinction between accredited and non-accredited investors.
119. See Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the
Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791,
41,791-92 (proposed Aug. 7, 1981) ("The registration requirements of the Securities Act and the
exemptive scheme therefrom have been criticized by commentators as disproportionately
burdensome for small issuers.").
120. See Campbell, Jr., supra note 117, at 921 ("With regard to capital formation, Regulation
D was based on the correct assumptions that transaction costs (offering costs) can throttle capital
formation and that it is relative, not absolute, offering costs that are important in that regard.").
121. § 230.501(a) (defining accredited investor).
122. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29,
2011) ("One purpose of the accredited investor concept is to identify persons who can bear the
economic risk of an investment in unregistered securities, including the ability to hold
unregistered (and therefore less liquid) securities for an indefinite period and, if necessary, to
afford a complete loss of such investment.").
123. Id.; see also § 230.501(a). Currently, sufficient net worth means a person with a net
worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, of over $1,000,000 (not including the value of
the individual's primary residence) or a person whose income exceeded $200,000 in each of the
past two years (or $300,000 if combined with spouse's income). § 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
124. See § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) ("Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or
with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the
issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within
this description."). Note, however, that "[m]any commentators have expressed the view that it is
impossible to evaluate an offeree's qualifications without providing the offeree basic information
concerning the offering." Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration
Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 46
Fed. Reg. at 41,802.
125. See § 230.502(b)(1) ("If the issuer sells securities under § 230.505 or § 230.506 to any
purchaser that is not an accredited investor, the issuer shall furnish the information specified in
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If the proposed sale is to accredited investors, the company-issuer
has some discretion on what information is provided. 126 However, if the
sale is to non-accredited investors, the company-issuer must provide
financial information (in addition to certain other disclosures) prior to
the sale.'27 The breadth of the financial disclosures depends on the size
of the offering, with larger offerings requiring more detailed disclo-
sures.128 Because private companies are not required to register financial
statements with the SEC, such information is not normally available to
potential purchasers.' 29
The apparent impetus in promulgating Rule 506 was to provide an
efficient mechanism for small businesses to raise money. In justifying
the Rule 506 exemption, the SEC noted that small businesses are "a vital
part of the American economy," and emphasized the need to "liberalize
sales of restricted securities and to make small offerings more viable."13
Rule 506 was therefore specifically designed to provide a "less costly
method of raising capital"'3 1 in response to the need for small compa-
nies to raise funds without complying with the oppressive strictures of
paragraph (b)(2) of this section ...."). Accredited investors do not trigger such disclosure
obligations because it is assumed "that accredited investors can fend for themselves without the
protections afforded by registration and thereby satisfy the requirements of proposed Rule
506(b)(1) without a separate subjective determination by the issuer." Proposed Revision of Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 46 Fed. Reg. at 41,802.
126. See Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEc. EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Jan. 16, 2013), http://
www.sec.gov/answers/ruleSO6.htm ("Companies must decide what information to give to
accredited investors, so long as it does not violate the antifraud prohibitions of the federal
securities laws. But companies must give non-accredited investors disclosure documents that are
generally the same as those used in registered offerings. If a company provides information to
accredited investors, it must make this information available to non-accredited investors as
well.").
127. See § 230.502(b)(1) ("If the issuer sells securities under § 230.505 or § 230.506 to any
purchaser that is not an accredited investor, the issuer shall furnish the information specified in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section to such purchaser a reasonable time prior to sale. The issuer is not
required to furnish the specified information to purchasers when it sells securities under
§ 230.504, or to any accredited investor.").
128. See § 230.502(b)(2)(B)(1-3).
129. SEC Disclosure Laws and Regulations, INc., http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/sec-
disclosure-laws-and-regulations.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) ("Companies that are privately
owned are not required by law to disclose detailed financial and operating information in most
instances. They enjoy wide latitude in deciding what types of information to make available to the
public. [They] may shield information from public knowledge and determine for themselves who
needs to know specific types of information.").
130. U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, 4 4 TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC iv-v, 16-17 (covering the
public hearings held by the SEC to determine "the effects of [SEC] rules and regulations on the
ability of small businesses to raise capital").
131. Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1980 on Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 46 Fed. Reg. 2,631,
2,633 (Jan. 12, 1981).
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the various federal securities laws. 132 However, if the capital needs of
small businesses were the only goal, the SEC would not have required
disclosures of any kind. Although certainly less burdensome than regis-
tration with the SEC, the disclosure requirements of Rule 506 remain an
imposition upon the small business issuer. By easing regulatory over-
sight through Rule 506, the SEC recognized that it created the potential
for companies to take advantage of certain investors. The SEC's very
existence is premised upon the fact that a laissez-faire approach to finan-
cial market regulation culminated in the Great Depression.1 33 Thus,
although there is significant evidence that the promulgation of Rule 506
was driven by the federal government's desire to craft an efficient way
for small businesses to raise funds, 134 the issue of information asymme-
try was also a primary motivation of the SEC. This is revealed in the
Rule 506 deliberations, which cite "access to the same kind of informa-
tion that registration would disclose" as a "primary consideration" for
Rule 506.'11 In fact, lack of access to information is the central motivat-
ing factor behind virtually all securities laws.' 36 Thus, it is not surprising
that this issue was of utmost importance to the drafters of Rule 506. In
sum, Rule 506's precontractual disclosure mechanism meets two seem-
ingly contradictory goals: (i) easing capital-raising regulations on small
businesses and (ii) protecting the most vulnerable population of potential
investors.
132. Rex A. Hurley & Carla Green, Florida's Response to the Need for Uniformity in Federal
and State Securities Registration Exemption Requirements, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 309, 313
(1984) ("The underlying rationale expressed for these exemptions was that small businesses could
not afford the burdensome transactional costs generally associated with complete registration.").
133. See SEIGMAN, supra note 106, at 2 (noting that the hearings that eventually led to the
enactment of federal securities laws and the establishment of the SEC were designed to combat
the fact that "a majority of the country's voters had supported the laissez-faire economic policies"
of Calvin Coolidge).
134. Marvin R. Mohney, Note, Regulation D: Coherent Exemptions for Small Businesses
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 121, 127 & n.43 (1982) ("In 1977, the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure reported to the SEC that its 'survey of publicly held
companies indicates that the burden of reporting weighs more heavily on small than large
companies.' "(citation omitted)).
135. Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1980 on Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 46 Fed. Reg. at 2632
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953)).
136. See SELIGMAN, supra note 106, at 604 ("At its core, the primary policy of the federal
securities laws today involves the remediation of information asymmetries. This policy most
obviously applies with respect to the mandatory disclosure system, which compels business
corporations and other issuers to disseminate detailed ... information when selling new securities
to the public .... ").
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2. THE PRIVATE SALE OF SECURITIES INFORMATION
ASYMMETRY ANALYSIS
The justifications for the promulgation of Rule 506 mirror the Dis-
closure Framework's information asymmetry concerns. As noted above,
one of the primary motivating factors supporting the promulgation of
Rule 506 was the desire to provide an efficient means of raising capital
for small businesses.1 37 However, the SEC was only interested in mak-
ing small business fundraising more efficient if it could do so without
lessening the protection of the potential investors. 38 To maintain such
protection, Rule 506 imposes precontractual disclosure requirements to
remedy information asymmetry between the company-issuer and the
would-be investor. More specifically, the SEC drafted Rule 506 to pro-
tect those prospective purchasers of securities who are deemed most sus-
ceptible to harm-the non-accredited investors.1 39 The disclosures help
such a person, the non-accredited investor, through mandatory disclo-
sure of financial information. By forcing companies to produce salient
financial information, the non-accredited investor is provided all the
tools necessary to make an informed decision. Thus, the point of Rule
506 was to provide an efficient capital-raising device for small busi-
nesses that is as fair as possible for non-accredited investors. 140 These
financial disclosures are designed to prevent the information-rich (the
issuing company) from taking advantage of the information-poor (the
would-be investor) by requiring the company to lay bare vital company-
specific information.
The information asymmetry analysis supports the imposition of
such disclosure to achieve equal access to the pertinent information. It
should be self-evident that in the issuer-investor relationship, the issuer
does not have equal access to the company's financial information. If an
investor wanted to obtain such information, such investor would have to
contact the company and request (and potentially negotiate for) the dis-
closure of the information. This expenditure of effort is clearly greater
than the effort that would have to be expended by the issuer, which
137. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
138. Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Act of 1980 on Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 46 Fed. Reg. at 2632.
139. However, note that unlike other exemptions, Rule 506 requires that "all non-accredited
investors, either alone or with a purchaser representative, must be sophisticated-that is, they
must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to make them
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment." Rule 506 of Regulation
D, supra note 126.
140. It should be noted, however, that actual disclosures for sales of securities to non-
accredited investors are rare because such disclosures are costly. See Proposed Revision of Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,791, 41,797 (proposed Aug. 7, 1981).
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would amount to no more than a phone call or e-mail to the company's
accountant. Thus, because the parties do not enjoy equal access to the
information, the information asymmetry analysis tips in favor of impos-
ing precontractual disclosure.
3. THE PRIVATE SALE OF SECURITIES STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
The stakeholder analysis of the Disclosure Framework reveals a
strong interest in imposing precontractual disclosure on the private sale
of securities. To identify the stakeholders at issue in the Rule 506
precontractual disclosure mandate, one must first look at the contract at
issue. The contract is the sale of private securities and the parties to the
contract are therefore the company desiring to issue such securities and
the potential purchasers of such securities. The party with a strong inter-
est in imposing precontractual disclosure is the potential investor. One
might be tempted to include the owners of the small businesses, such as
shareholders, because they are directly affected by the transaction. How-
ever, while these parties have an interest in the transaction, they do not
have an interest in imposing precontractual disclosure (because they are
the owners of the entity that will ultimately bear the costs of disclosure).
Thus, the only stakeholder in this transaction for the purposes of the
Disclosure Framework is the would-be investor.
The next step, weighing the respective harms of either disclosure or
nondisclosure, reveals a strong interest in favor of mandating disclosure.
If precontractual disclosure were not required in this transaction, non-
accredited investors would not receive the direct benefit of the regula-
tion (the disclosure of financial statements) and would be forced to make
the investment decision in the absence of full information. In other
words, the potential harm is that the non-accredited investor, an individ-
ual whose net worth cannot sustain a complete loss of the investment,
would enter into an uninformed investment decision. This is contrary to
both notions of innate fairness and freedom of contract principles. Alter-
natively, if the disclosure requirements of Rule 506 are imposed, all
non-accredited investors receive certain financial information of the
issuing company and are therefore given the opportunity to make an
informed decision regarding the investment. The harm to the company-
issuer is the cost of disclosing financial information. This cost is not
insignificant, but pales in comparison to the potential harm to non-
accredited investors. Thus, the harms suffered by the disclosing party are
outweighed by the potential harm to the stakeholder group-the non-
accredited investors.
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C. A Statutory-Common Law Hybrid Exception to the General Rule
American jurisprudence has imposed a duty of precontractual dis-
closure through both court decisions and the promulgation of statutes.
These mechanisms are not, however, mutually exclusive; and legislators
do not hesitate to act in areas in which courts have spoken. This possibil-
ity is illustrated in the following discussion, which analyzes the precon-
tractual disclosure mechanism for residential real estate transactions.
This precontractual disclosure requirement was initially established in
court decisions, with subsequent decisions imposing escalating duties
upon sellers of residential real estate. In the midst of this, state legisla-
tures enacted statutes to codify the ever-increasing pro-consumer deci-
sions. This is therefore an example of where the Disclosure Framework
might have provided a helpful mechanism for the legislature to take into
account all relevant stakeholder interests before imposing precontractual
disclosure.
1. PRECONTRACTUAL DISCLOSURE IN PRIVATE HOME SALES
In many states, before a seller may convey non-commercial real
estate to a buyer, the seller must disclose material information about
such property.' 4 1 This information must be provided prior to the sale,
and the potential buyer can either back out of the purchase or negotiate a
different price. The first of these statutes was enacted in California,
which provided the model for many of the states that followed.142
California enacted two statutes to require disclosures prior to the
transfer of residential property: (i) California Civil Code Section 1102.1
(the "Disclosures Upon Transfer of Residential Property") 143 and (ii)
California Civil Code Section 2079 (the "Duty to Prospective Purchaser
141. ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.010 (2012); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 (West Supp.
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (Supp. 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508D-5
(LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 55-2501 to 2518 (2012); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 77/1-99 (West 2001 & Supp. 2012); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-21-5-1 to 13 (West
2012); IOWA CODE § 558.70 (2012); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (LexisNexis 2011); MD.
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 565.951-966 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1-501 to 523 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,120 (2009); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-c (LexisNexis
Supp. 2012); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
60, §§ 831-839 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013); OR. REv. STAT. § 105.465-.490 (2011); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 5-20.8-1 to 11 (2009 & Supp. 2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-4-37 to 44 (2012);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to 210 (1993 & Supp. 2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008
(West Supp. 2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to 525 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.06.005-.900 (West 2005 & Supp. 2013); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 709.01-.08 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2012).
142. Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation, 44
DEPAUL L. REV. 381, 410 (1995).
143. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15.
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of Residential Property") l ' (together, the "California Statutes"). The
California Statutes require any seller or broker of residential real prop-
erty 4 5 to provide certain disclosures prior to consummating any sales
contract.146 The required disclosures are detailed in a Real Estate Trans-
fer Disclosure Statement, and include representations as to the existence
and operation of appliances; 47 the existence of harmful materials,
including asbestos, radon gas, and lead paint; 148 flooding, drainage, or
grading problems;' 49  and even whether the home suffers from
"[n]eighborhood noise problems or other nuisances."15 The required
disclosures in the Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement were an
attempt to identify the material facts that a reasonable buyer would want
to know before entering into a contract. By requiring delivery of the
disclosures before the execution of a contract,' 5 1 the California Statutes
provide the potential purchaser the opportunity to consider material facts
about the property prior to entering into the contract.'15 In other words,
this is an example of a statute imposing precontractual disclosure upon a
private transaction.
2. MOTIVATION FOR THE CALIFORNIA STATUTES
The California Statutes were enacted in direct response to an evolv-
ing common law that imposed an expanding duty upon sellers and bro-
kers of residential real estate. 153 Decisions across the country reflected
the judiciary's desire to effectively flip the duty to investigate real prop-
erty from the buyer to the seller, 154 and in many states, "the common
law provide[d] ... causes of action for .... fraudulent nondisclosure of
144. Id. §§ 2079-2079.10.
145. "Residential Real Property" is defined as more than one, but fewer than four, dwelling
units. Id. § 2079.1.
146. Id. §§ 1102.1-1102.15.
147. Id. § 1102.6.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at §1102.3(b).
152. If the seller provides the disclosures after execution of a sales agreement (including any
material amendment to any disclosure given), the purchaser "shall have three days after delivery
in person or five days after delivery by deposit in the mail, to terminate his or her offer by delivery
of a written notice of termination . I..." d
153. Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Disclose?,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 693 (1992) ("In direct response to the Easton decision, the
California Legislature enacted two statutes in 1985 which defined the legal duty owed by a broker
to a buyer and specified the types of disclosure that must be made to prospective purchasers."
(footnote omitted)); see also Washburn, supra note 142, at 409-10.
154. Regardless of state statute protection, the buyer has an incentive to investigate the
property because "a purchaser who has completed an inspection is in a better position to establish
the elements of reasonable reliance and causation." Washburn, supra note 142, at 405.
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material defects."1 55 The California Statutes were not intended to serve
as a replacement of the common law, but were rather an attempt to sim-
plify the expanding common law disclosure requirements.' 56 These
requirements, which outlined the duties of residential real property sell-
ers and brokers, were laid out and justified in Easton v. Strassburger.157
In Easton, the California Court of Appeals imposed a duty on real
estate brokers to investigate and disclose material facts concerning resi-
dential real property to potential buyers.5 8 Prior to this decision, com-
mon law imposed upon a broker a duty to disclose known defects.' 59
Easton, however, went further to impose a duty to disclose all material
defects, whether known or unknown.1 6' This includes the duty "to dis-
close material information to a prospective purchaser" and "to conduct a
reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the property."' 6' This
duty to inspect, the court noted, was implicit in precedent. 6 2 More spe-
cifically, the court held that prior caselaw "speaks not only to facts
known by the broker, but also and independently to facts that are acces-
sible only to [the broker].' 63
Because Easton imposed new duties on real estate brokers, this
decision predictably inspired a concerted effort by California's broker
community to limit potential liability.' 64 This effort spurred the state
legislature to enact the California Statutes to rein in the evolving com-
mon law (thereby limiting the liability and duties of brokers). 165
3. THE CALIFORNIA STATUTES AND THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
The precontractual disclosure obligation imposed by the California
Statutes is in harmony with the Disclosure Framework. However, the
first step of the Disclosure Framework, measuring information asymme-
try, is barely satisfied. Absent the requirement of precontractual disclo-
sure, homebuyers would be forced to conduct a detailed investigation of
the potential home. The imposition of precontractual disclosure places
the burden of identifying and communicating material facts concerning
155. Id. at 404.
156. See S. 1377, 1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) ("The Legislature does not intend to
adversely affect the existing obligations of the parties to a real estate contract .
157. 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
158. See id. at 391.
159. See Washburn, supra note 142, at 387-88 (citation omitted).
160. See id. at 408 (citing Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88).
161. Id.
162. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (citing Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976); Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
163. Id.
164. See Washburn, supra note 142, at 409.
165. See id.
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the property upon the seller or the broker (i.e., the party that has the best
access to such facts). Given the imbalance of access to the house, if both
parties were to expend identical effort into investigating the house, the
sellers and brokers would enjoy a slight advantage over the buyers.
There is therefore information asymmetry in this relationship, but it is
not great.
The second step of the Disclosure Framework, the stakeholder anal-
ysis, reveals that the only stakeholder in this transaction is the potential
buyer of residential real estate. This is because the only interest that
matters for the stakeholder analysis is the interest in imposing precon-
tractual disclosure. Neither sellers nor brokers have any interest in
imposing precontractual disclosure because precontractual disclosure
would increase the burden of these parties. Initially, it might appear that
the costs saved by the stakeholder group (the buyers) in imposing
precontractual disclosure are virtually identical to the costs expended by
the sellers or brokers because either party would be forced to inspect the
home. However, because a real estate broker will likely show a particu-
lar house to several prospective customers, and because a prospective
buyer will likely view several different houses, the costs are much
greater for the buyers over the course of the home-buying experience.
That is, absent the precontractual disclosure obligation, each potential
homebuyer would be required to engage in a detailed investigation of
each home considered. Assuming there is more than one interested
buyer, this results in numerous investigations of the same house. With
the obligation placed upon the broker or seller, only one investigation
per house is required, and the results of such investigation may be given
to each interested potential buyer. This greatly increases the efficiency
of the transaction and reduces the potential costs to the stakeholders-
the potential homebuyers.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE DISCLOSURE FRAMEWORK
As illustrated by Section III, examples in which courts and legisla-
tors have deviated from the general rule against precontractual disclo-
sure are in harmony with the Disclosure Framework. Thus, the
Disclosure Framework enjoys both theoretical support (from the per-
spective of freedom of contract principles) and historical support. To
illustrate the application of the Disclosure Framework in a prospective
manner, this section will apply the analysis to the hypothetical student's
conundrum described at the article's outset. This analysis will reveal that
the student loan fact pattern satisfies both factors of the Disclosure Anal-
ysis. Through illustration of the application, this section will demon-
strate how the Disclosure Framework operates to identify an appropriate
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imposition of precontractual disclosure while maintaining and support-
ing freedom of contract principles.
A. The Student Loan Problem
We can now turn to the hypothetical described at this article's out-
set. To summarize, a prospective student is trying to determine the
financial implications of choosing one school over another. One of the
schools provided a financial aid letter that outlined estimated expenses,
the amount most students borrow to attend the school, the loan default
rate of graduates, and an estimated monthly payment. Unfortunately, the
other school did not provide a similar letter, and the student is left to
compare financial aid packages without complete information.
1. "[W]HEN I GRADUATE, I'M GOING TO OWE LIKE $900 A MONTH.
No ONE TOLD ME THAT." 16 6
This contractual relationship has become quite pressing lately. The
total amount of student loan debt, $956 billion as of late 2012,167 has
eclipsed revolving debt168 and continues to grow at an annual rate of
13.9 percent.1 69 The size of these numbers becomes even more troubling
when one considers the high delinquency rate of student loans.' 70 The
sheer magnitude of student loan defaults on private loans, as much as
$8.1 billion, is startling.' 71 Defaults and delinquencies carry a threat of
112potentially devastating consequences for the borrower.
If a loan goes into default, the entire unpaid amount of the loan
immediately becomes due. Defaulted borrowers may be sued, tax
refunds may be intercepted, and wages may be garnished. The defaulted
borrower is responsible for paying collection fees, collection costs, court
costs, and attorney fees. Defaulted borrowers also can be denied a pro-
fessional license. Eligibility for future loan deferments is withdrawn, as
is eligibility for other federal student aid under federal benefit programs.
166. Andrew Martin & Andrew W. Lehren, A Generation Hobbled by College Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 2012, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Jill Schlesinger, Student loan debt nears $1 trillion: Is it the new subprime?, CBSNEWS
(Nov. 28, 2012, 10:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com8301-505145_162-57555780/student-loan-
debt-nears-$1 -trillion-is-it-the-new-subprime/.
168. Kelly D. Edmiston, Lara Brooks & Steven Shepelwich, Student Loans: Overview and
Issues 4, 17 tbl.2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City Cmty. Affairs Dep't, Research Working Paper
No. 12-05, 2012).
169. See id. at I (citing FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD
DEBT AND CREDIT 171 (2012) [hereinafter QUARTERLY REPORT]).
170. See id. at 4 ("Delinquencies are very high compared to delinquencies on many other
forms of debt... impair[ing] the credit of a substantial share of borrowers and prevent[ing] them
from accessing other forms of student aid .... ).
171. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 64 (2012).
172. See Edmiston, Brooks & Shepelwich, supra note 168, at 4, 12.
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Finally, "student loan delinquencies are reported to the major credit
bureaus."1 73
Not surprisingly, this reality affects a borrower's spending, both
because of the lack of discretionary funds and the lack of access to other
credit (due to lower credit ratings). 174 In addition to these financial pres-
sures, the burden of carrying this debt has a psychological toll on both
students and parents. 175
Beyond the impact on individuals, the issue of rising student loan
debt is one that might have a broader economic impact. Although most
economists believe that a collapse of the student loan system would not
have "the same devastating impact as the mortgage crash" (despite the
fact that the student loan system is "larger than credit card and other
consumer debt"), experts note that the "dark cloud" of student debt hin-
ders economic recovery. 176
All of these issues might be more palatable if the students were
entering into the student loan contracts in an informed manner. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case. First, student loan applications and award
letters are both "complicated" and "difficult to compare."' 177 Financial
aid award letters "vary greatly among institutions in both content and
presentation," and any tools for students to assess the potential impact of
a student loan are "complex and often difficult to locate."' 178
Perhaps most upsetting is the fact that many students turn to private
loans before exhausting all available federal loans.'7 9 Federal loans often
carry lower interest rates and more flexible payment options, but accord-
ing to a 2008 study, "students and parents do not fully grasp the differ-
ences between private and federal student loan options."' 8 ° Assuming
rational economic action on the part of students, were the students to
realize that federal loans were available, they would not resort to the
higher interest rates offered by private loans and credit cards.18" '
173. Id. at 12.
174. See id. at 7.
175. See id. at 12-13 ("An often overlooked aspect of individual student debt problems is the
psychological burden it imposes on delinquent borrowers.").
176. Martin & Lehren, supra note 166.
177. Edmiston, Brooks & Shepelwich, supra note 168, at 12.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 3, 12 (noting that "[p]rivate loans ... are not guaranteed by the federal
government or otherwise subsidized" and that "[a]necdotal reports ... show[ ] that some students
take on private loans while still eligible for subsidized federal loans").
180. Carol A. Jensen, Private Loan Counseling for Undergraduate Students: The Role of
College Financial Aid Counselors, ENROLLMENT MGMT. J., Summer 2010, at 94, 107 (emphasis
omitted).
181. In addition to the evidence of financial harm suffered by students, there is circumstantial
evidence of a strong public policy interest in the fact that the Dodd-Frank Act specifically required
the CFPB to submit a report on private student loans. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
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2. THE SHOPPING SHEET: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
Despite the size and reach of the student loan problem, it is not a
completely intractable predicament. In fact, a partnership between the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") and the Department of
Education has created a letter that provides the information described in
the hypothetical. This letter, otherwise known as the "Shopping Sheet,"
not only contains information such as the average cost of attending the
particular school, the school's graduation and retention rate, and the per-
centage of students who default on their federal loans, but it also pro-
vides some perspective on such information. 18 2 For example, a school's
loan default rate is characterized as low, medium, or high.183 Thus, a
default rate of 6.2% is not merely reported, it is put into context, and the
student knows that a 6.2% default rate is about average. 184 The gradua-
tion rate and the retention rate of the school are compared to those of
other schools in a similar fashion. 8 5 Thus, the school's data is not
merely conveyed, but is communicated in a meaningful and comprehen-
sible manner.
Unfortunately, schools are not required to provide the Shopping
Sheet. 18 6 Legislators could ameliorate both the problem presented in the
hypothetical and the problem of rising student debt generally by making
the Shopping Sheet mandatory for all colleges and universities. In fact,
Congress is currently considering taking this step. On May 24, 2012,
Senators Al Franken, Tom Harkin, Chuck Grassley, Richard Blumen-
thal, Chuck Schumer, Barbara Mikulski, Tim Johnson, Ron Wyden, and
Ben Cardin introduced the "Understanding the True Cost of College
Act," which would require all colleges and universities to use a disclo-
sure letter similar to the Shopping Sheet.' 87 Given that Congress is cur-
rently considering whether or not it is appropriate to impose disclosure
in this relationship, this fact pattern is a perfect opportunity to analyze
111-203, § 1077(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2075 (2010). This mandate required the CFPB to examine,
among other issues, "the consumer protections available to private education loan borrowers,
including the effectiveness of existing disclosures and requirements and borrowers' awareness and
understanding about terms and conditions of various financial products." Id. § 1077(b)(8).
182. See How to Pay for College, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumer
finance.gov/static/students/disclosure.pdf, (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (providing an example of
the Shopping Sheet for a fictitious student considering a fictitious school).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Schools are only required to provide a Shopping Sheet to veterans. See Exec. Order
No.13,607, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,861 (May 2, 2012).
187. Press Release, Senator Al Franken, Sen. Franken Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Help
Families and Students Understand the True Cost of College (May 24, 2012), available at http:/f
www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press-release&id=2093.
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the proposed disclosure requirement in light of the Disclosure
Framework.
B. The Disclosure Framework
1. THE STUDENT LOAN INFORMATION ASYMMETRY ANALYSIS
Although some information provided on the Shopping Sheet is
available to our hypothetical student through other means, much of the
information is in the sole possession of the schools. Such information
includes the median borrowing rate and the loan default rate. This data is
virtually unobtainable without the school's cooperation because, in order
to determine this information, one would have to identify all former stu-
dents of the school that undertook student loans and contact each former
student to collect the necessary data. Even if a list of former students
were public, the endeavor would prove terribly time-consuming and
inefficient.
Perhaps the most poignant evidence of information asymmetry con-
cerns the fact that students are forced to obtain all relevant information
from the school. According to the results of a CFPB collection of public
comments, students expressed difficulty in obtaining "reliable informa-
tion" regarding private student loans.' 88 Most student respondents
reported that they were "dependent on the school's financial aid office
for information on student loans," and many respondents "believed that
the quality of information they received was inadequate." '89 The fact
that the students are dependent upon the schools to provide the informa-
tion is evidence that there is an accessibility problem.1 90
Further, even when a student has some information, regardless of
its veracity, it is presented in a confusing manner. As noted by the
CFPB, "[t]oo often, students receive financial aid award letters that are
laden with jargon, use inconsistent terms and calculations and make it
unnecessarily difficult to compare different financial aid awards side by
188. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 171, at 70.
189. Id.
190. A recent district court decision emphasizes the problem of relying upon facts provided by
the school. Although the case involved graduate students, the information asymmetry is virtually
identical to the undergraduate hypothetical. In this case, the plaintiffs, recent graduates of the
Thomas M. Cooley Law School, sued the law school on the grounds that Cooley provided
misleading information regarding the percentage of Cooley graduates employed and the average
starting salary for Cooley graduates. See MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 788-90 (W.D. Mich. 2012). The court, despite noting that Cooley's proffered
statistics were "inconsistent, confusing, and inherently untrustworthy," held that "an ordinarily
prudent person would not have relied" upon such statistics. Id. at 796-97. The court chastised the
plaintiffs for believing the statistics, and noted that the plaintiffs "should have approached their
decision to enter law school with extreme caution given the size of the investment." Id. at 797.
Thus, the court suggested that statistics provided by a school should be viewed as suspect. See id.
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side."'' Ultimately, the result is that students enter into contracts that
they do not understand.'92 This problem is reflected in the Dodd-Frank
Act, which specifically asked the CFPB to examine whether the public
enjoys "access to information sufficient to provide . . . assurances that
private education loans are provided in accord with the Nation's fair
lending laws and that allows public officials to determine lender compli-
ance with fair lending laws." 93
Given these facts, it may be obvious that the parties do not enjoy
equal access to the information at hand. Indeed, the information asym-
metry analysis clearly shows a high level of information asymmetry. As
a reminder, the information asymmetry analysis asks whether the parties
would have an equal probability of discovering the facts if they
expended the same amount of energy. If the answer is no, then there is
information asymmetry great enough to continue to the second step of
the Disclosure Framework. With respect to the student's effort to be
expended, the effort is greatly increased by the fact that information is
difficult or impossible to obtain, and that any information received is
presented in a complicated or misleading fashion. In comparison, the
school's effort necessary to discover the facts to be disclosed is not
insignificant (the costs of maintaining the data), but it is significantly
less than the required effort of the student. In the very least, the school
does not rely upon another party to either produce a list of former stu-
dents or determine such students' contact information. In sum, the infor-
mation asymmetry in the contractual relationship between prospective
students and student loan lenders (acting through the schools) is suffi-
cient to satisfy the first factor of the Disclosure Framework.
2. THE STUDENT LOAN STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
Having established that the information asymmetry in this relation-
ship satisfies the first step, the next step in the Disclosure Framework is
identifying the stakeholders and weighing the relevant harms. First, one
must identify the stakeholders, or the parties that are directly affected by
the transaction who have an interest in imposing precontractual disclo-
sure. The most obvious stakeholder is the potential party to the student
loan contract: the student. However, this does not represent the entire
universe of stakeholders, as in many cases, parents of students are
191. Richard Cordray, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks in a Press Conference Call:
College Costs Transparency 6 (July 23, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/obama-administration-and-consumer-financia-protection-bureau-partner-promote-tr
(follow "Press Call Transcript" hyperlink).
192. Id. (noting that the CFPB has "heard from many student loan borrowers who say that they
simply do not understand what they signed up for").
193. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1077(b)(9), 124 Stat. 1376, 2076 (2010).
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directly affected by either co-signing on their child's student loans or
taking out loans to support their child's education.' 94
Once the stakeholders group is identified, the next step is to con-
sider the stakeholder group's interest in imposing precontractual disclo-
sure. If precontractual disclosure is mandated-if, in other words, the
Shopping Sheet is made mandatory for all schools-the clear benefi-
ciaries would be students and parents. Students and parents would bene-
fit by having the opportunity to make informed decisions concerning the
amount and type of loans accepted. The parties harmed by mandated
disclosure include the would-be private student loan lenders, as they will
likely see a decrease of overall student loans. This is not only due to
students opting not to attend schools they cannot afford, but also because
more students would presumably opt for less-expensive federal student
loans. The harm suffered by private lenders if precontractual disclosure
were mandated (lowering the total potential loan pool) is significantly
outweighed by the harms currently suffered by the other stakeholders
(entering into ill-formed loan agreements and taking on excessive
amounts of debt).
Further, there is a viable argument that the private lenders would
reap some benefit from mandated precontractual disclosure. Private
lenders are currently facing over $8 billion of student loan defaults, rep-
resenting over 850,000 separate loans. 195 This default rate is significant.
If one were to combine this default rate with the fact that a significant
portion of private student loan borrowers graduate without a job (and
that those who are employed have jobs that do not pay enough to make
loan payments), 96 then there is reason to think that mandated precon-
tractual disclosure would not harm private student lenders as much as
the previous paragraph suggests. To be sure, there is a possibility of a
lower total number of student loans issued, but this loss may be miti-
gated by a presumed reduction in the number of defaults. Regardless, the
harm suffered by private lenders in mandating precontractual disclosure
(lowering the total potential loan pool) is significantly outweighed by
the harms currently suffered by the stakeholder group (entering into ill-
formed loan agreements and taking on excessive amounts of debt).
194. See Gail MarksJarvis, Parents Also Must Avoid Crippling Student Debt, CHI. TRIB. (Apr.
29, 2012); see also Edmiston, Brooks & Shepelwich, supra note 168, at 3 (describing the PLUS
Loans program, in which loans "are made to parents of ... students who have reached the
borrowing limits for Stafford loans," and noting that "[b]ecause of the limited credit histories of
most students, co-signers are often required" for private loans).
195. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 175, at 4.
196. See id. ("In 2009, the unemployment rate for private student loan borrowers who started
school in the 2003-2004 academic year was 16%. Ten percent of recent graduates of four-year
colleges have monthly payments for all education loans in excess of 25% of their income.").
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CONCLUSION
Information asymmetry is virtually ever-present. In many cases, the
use of information asymmetry to one's advantage is an inevitable symp-
tom of a free market. But in some instances, information asymmetry is
so great that it frustrates an individual's ability to privately order his or
her contractual arrangements. Once information asymmetry rises to this
level, the principles of a free market are endangered and it is appropriate
to consider actions to lessen information asymmetry. Such actions are
appropriate if the harm of nondisclosure outweighs the harm of disclo-
sure. This is, in a nutshell, the Disclosure Framework.
A lawmaker's use of the Disclosure Framework will properly iden-
tify transactions in which mandating precontractual disclosure is appro-
priate. However, the Disclosure Framework's application need not be
limited to use by legislators. Because the Disclosure Framework identi-
fies instances in which mandating precontractual disclosure is both his-
torically consistent and theoretically justified, the analysis may also
provide a convincing argument for consumer protection groups to urge
lawmakers to act. For example, if a student rights group wished to con-
vince Congress to make the Shopping Sheet mandatory, the Disclosure
Framework may provide a convincing argument that the Shopping
Sheet's required disclosure is not only necessary, but appropriate for
legislative action.
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